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DON’T TRY THIS AT HOME: THE FDA’S 
RESTRICTIVE REGULATION OF HOME-
TESTING DEVICES 
SHELBY BAIRD† 
ABSTRACT 
  Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has successfully restricted consumers’ access to home-testing 
applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from 
their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied 
women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used 
in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns 
about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical 
ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently, 
it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic 
testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers 
would make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant 
results.  
  Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the “safety 
and effectiveness” of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the 
term “safety” to encompass considerations of how consumers might 
use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note 
argues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad 
interpretation of “safety” in restricting home-testing devices. It 
documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial 
deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies, 
including the FDA, “super deference” because of the complicated 
nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA’s 
interpretation of “safety” because it did not use its scientific expertise 
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when it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing 
and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the 
authority to make decisions based on its view of “safety” because it 
should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers 
about whether they should seek their personal medical information.  
INTRODUCTION 
For most of 2013, American consumers had unprecedented access 
to information about their genetics. For ninety-nine dollars, anyone 
could purchase 23andMe’s direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing 
kit, send in a saliva sample, and receive over two hundred 
individualized health reports on certain nonmedical traits, such as 
ancestry,1 and information on DNA variants linked to higher risks for 
diseases, such as type 2 diabetes and Alzheimer’s.2  
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) eliminated this access 
when it issued a strongly worded Warning Letter to 23andMe on 
November 23, 2013.3 The FDA ordered the company to “immediately 
discontinue marketing” its testing services until it received marketing 
authorization for its health reports, which the FDA characterized as 
“medical device uses” requiring premarket approval.4 The FDA 
justified this restriction by noting that some of the intended uses for 
the kits were “particularly concerning.”5 For instance, it said that 
“serious concerns are raised if test results are not adequately 
understood by patients.”6 Further, it stated that consumers could 
overreact to test results by undergoing unnecessary treatments or could 
rely on the information to self-manage their own treatments through 
 
 1. Robert Hof, Seven Months After FDA Slapdown, 23andMe Returns with New Health 
Report Submission, FORBES (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/
2014/06/20/seven-months-after-fda-slapdown-23andme-returns-with-new-health-report-
submission/#3af1662277d6 [https://perma.cc/U8NH-EZQC]. 
 2. Robert C. Green & Nita A. Farahany, The FDA Is Overcautious on Consumer 
Genomics, 505 NATURE 286, 286 (2014). 
 3. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological 
Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Anne Wojcicki, 
CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/
WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm [https://perma.cc/9GRR-8WCT] [hereinafter Warning 
Letter to 23andMe]. 
 4. In making this determination, the FDA cited its authority under section 201(h) of the 
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act to require premarket approval for devices “intended for use 
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease,” or “intended to affect the structure or function of the body.” Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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dose changes or the abandonment of certain therapies.7 The FDA also 
noted that 23andMe had not assured the agency that it had 
“analytically or clinically validated” the tests for their intended uses.8 
Demonstration of analytical validity requires the manufacturer to show 
that the test accurately detects the presence or absence of a particular 
genetic variant, whereas clinical validity requires that the genetic 
variant is actually related to the “presence, absence, or risk of a specific 
disease.”9 As this Note will discuss, what the FDA required of 
23andMe went beyond the definition of clinical validity; instead, the 
FDA wanted assurances that consumers could make sound medical 
decisions with the information given to them by the test.10 In light of 
the concerns for consumer reactions and the tests’ validity, the FDA’s 
letter notified 23andMe that it needed to seek premarket approval as 
a Class III device,11 which receives the FDA’s highest level of scrutiny.12 
After 23andMe spent four years cooperating with the FDA’s 
lengthy evaluation process, the FDA only recently approved ten of 
23andMe’s health reports for genes linked to disease risk.13 The FDA 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. How Can Consumers Be Sure a Genetic Test Is Valid and Useful?, NIH U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY MED. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/validtest [https://perma.cc/
VR6G-MYKF].  
 10. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment: The FDA & 23andMe Conflict, DUKE SCI. & SOC’Y, 
https://scienceandsociety.duke.edu/paternalism-vs-empowerment-the-fda-23andme-conflict 
[https://perma.cc/UY2J-ZA8K] [hereinafter Paternalism vs. Empowerment] (arguing that the 
FDA wrongly considered consumer reactions as clinical validity concerns); infra Part II.C. An 
explanation of the difference as it affects 23andMe states:  
[T]he FDA fails to acknowledge a distinction between providing information and 
providing opportunities to act upon information. The difference is between the need 
for a “device” to be analytically valid and clinically valid (or both). 23andMe provides 
genetic information to individuals; any health and medical decisions people make 
based on that information are entirely separate from the services directly provided . . . 
23andMe clearly advertised its product as being “for informational use only.” It in no 
way produces, markets, or distributes a device used by individuals in acting upon their 
medical decisions. A concern with the “clinical validity” of genetic information is . . . a 
concern with our general understanding of genetics and health. Clinical validity should 
be addressed in discussions regarding the technologies individuals use to act on their 
genetic information, not in discussing information access. 
Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra.  
 11. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3.  
 12. Stephanie P. Fekete, Litigating Medical Device Premarket Classification Decisions for 
Small Businesses: Have the Courts Given the FDA Too Much Deference? The Case for Taking the 
Focus Off of Efficacy, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 611–12 (2015). 
 13. The FDA approved tests for gene variants “associated with an increased risk for 
developing . . . the following [ten] diseases or conditions”: Parkinson’s disease, late-onset 
Alzheimer’s disease, celiac disease, alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency, early-onset primary dystonia, 
factor XI deficiency, Gaucher disease type 1, glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency, 
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granted the approval after 23andMe submitted several studies to 
demonstrate analytical and clinical validity.14 The FDA also announced 
that, even though it is creating new criteria for evaluating genetic 
health risk (GHR) tests, it will continue to consider “clinical relevance” 
in its evaluation and will refuse market authorization for genetic tests 
that “function as diagnostic tests” and could be used for treatment 
decisions.15 Although the authorization of these ten tests represents a 
step forward for improved access to DTC genetic testing, the FDA’s 
continued focus on clinical validity, as well as its refusal to approve any 
diagnostic tests, indicates that the FDA is still regulating these services 
based on its concerns over actions that consumers might take after they 
receive test results. 
The FDA’s central rationale for regulating DTC genetic testing—
its trepidation about potential reactions to results—is alarming because 
the agency is unlawfully restricting consumers’ access to their personal 
medical information based on concerns about how individuals might 
respond to the very test results that they sought out. The FDA certainly 
has the statutory authority to promulgate regulations to ensure the 
“safety and effectiveness” of medical devices before they are 
marketed,16 but the FDA’s interpretation of safety greatly expands its 
power. By interpreting the term “safety” to encompass considerations 
of how consumers might use the information to make medical 
decisions—which are separate from the device’s purpose of giving an 
accurate test result—the FDA affords itself broader discretion to 
regulate medical devices.17  
The 23andMe story is indicative of a larger trend within the FDA: 
the agency has limited consumer access to personal medical 
information based on concerns that consumers will have negative 
reactions and make poor clinical decisions after receiving test results. 
 
hereditary hemochromatosis, and hereditary thrombophilia. FDA Allows Marketing of First 
Direct-to-Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm [https://perma.cc/FA29-E6BV] [hereinafter 23andMe 
Approval Announcement]. 
 14. Id. For further discussion of these studies, see infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
 15. 23andMe Approval Announcement, supra note 13. For further discussion of these 
changes, see infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text. 
 16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring that the FDA evaluate all medical 
devices to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device”).  
 17. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (explaining that “any health and 
medical decisions people make based on that information are entirely separate from the services 
directly provided”). For further discussion, see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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For example, in 1972, the FDA seized several thousand Ova II home 
pregnancy tests, which had only been on the market for one year.18 The 
FDA justified this seizure with questions about the product’s reliability 
in the hands of laywomen19 even though the test was “‘identical” to 
those used by laboratories and “purported to be reasonably accurate” 
when used by consumers.20 Then, in 1988, in the midst of the 
HIV/AIDS crisis, the FDA refused to consider device approval 
applications for home HIV blood-test kits.21 This ban barred 
manufacturers from demonstrating that their home-testing kits were 
safe and effective.22 The FDA’s decision to limit applications to 
diagnostic tests performed in clinical settings has been widely regarded 
as a reaction to concerns that individuals would make rash decisions if 
they did not receive counseling about their HIV test results.23  
These three cases illustrate a recurring theme: when the FDA 
evaluates a device that gives consumers greater power to discover 
important personal medical information through home-testing, the 
agency restricts the device’s use under the guise of public safety and 
relies on concerns about potential negative reactions to justify those 
restrictions. This Note analyzes whether the FDA’s statutory authority 
to ensure the safety of medical devices empowers the FDA to consider 
how consumers might use information obtained from an effective and 
nonharmful test, which does not make claims about clinical application. 
Although there are several different frameworks for analyzing 
agencies’ interpretations of their own authority, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on judicial deference shows that agency expertise is a 
 
 18. Richard D. Lyons, Pregnancy Tests Held Unreliable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1972), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1972/12/13/archives/pregnancy-tests-held-unreliable-doityourself-
detection-kits-are.html [https://perma.cc/Q2ZQ-S5F8].  
 19. Id. (stating that the FDA seized the tests because it thought they were “inaccurate, 
unreliable and prone to give false results”). 
 20. Joan H. Robinson, Bringing the Pregnancy Test Home from the Hospital, 46 SOC. STUD. 
SCI. 649, 657 (2016).  
 21. Steven R. Salbu, HIV Home Testing and the FDA: The Case for Regulatory Restraint, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 407 (1995).  
 22. Id. at 452–53. 
 23. See id. at 453 (arguing that the ban on home-testing device applications “implied that the 
FDA’s foremost concern regarding HIV home-testing products was not primary safety and 
effectiveness,” but were instead, “considered unacceptable in principle” because of “social 
considerations”); Roger Parloff, The Quiet Scandal of the HIV Home Test Kit, FORTUNE (July 9, 
2012), http://fortune.com/2012/07/09/the-quiet-scandal-of-the-hiv-home-test-kit [https://perma.
cc/2FRB-6RMH] (explaining that the FDA enacted a ban on applications for HIV home tests 
“[o]ut of concern that some people might respond emotionally and irrationally” to the 
information provided by the tests). 
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central justification for deferring to an interpretation.24 Additionally, 
courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, “super 
deference” because of the complicated nature of their work.25  
This Note argues that courts should not give the FDA deference 
on its expansive interpretation of “safety” in restricting home-testing 
applications because the FDA did not use its expertise as a scientific 
agency when it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-
testing and DTC genetic testing results. Further, this Note argues that, 
as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the authority to make 
decisions based on this view of “safety” because it should not make 
value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their 
own personal medical information. The FDA should not be able to 
restrict individual access by effectively deciding that consumers cannot 
weigh the potential risks and benefits of seeking these test results, 
particularly when consumers can easily find all of the relevant 
information for doing so.  
Part I explains the history of the FDA’s statutory authority to 
regulate medical devices and demonstrates that Congress granted the 
FDA the authority to make scientific inquiries into whether devices 
directly cause physical harm to consumers. Part II describes three cases 
in which the FDA has expanded the meaning of “safety” to restrict 
access to devices that provide consumers with personal medical 
information. Part III first shows that the FDA’s interpretation of 
“safety” is outside the scope of the statutory provision’s clear meaning. 
Then, it documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for 
judicial deference and argues that courts should not defer to the FDA’s 
interpretation of “safety” because the FDA did not use its scientific 
expertise in the relevant considerations. Finally, this Note argues that, 
as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the ability to restrict access 
 
 24. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002) (arguing that the 
expertise rationale for deference has the strongest justification for judicial deference); Paul 
Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA 
Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525–31 (2014) (providing an 
overview of how agency expertise is central to the Supreme Court’s doctrine on judicial deference 
to agency statutory interpretation).  
 25. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial 
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011) (explaining that this 
view is “encapsulated in the principle that courts ought to be at their ‘most deferential’ when 
reviewing an agency’s scientific determinations” (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983))). 
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to devices giving personal medical information based on a paternalistic 
view of public safety. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE FDA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE 
MEDICAL DEVICES 
This Part provides a brief overview of the legislation granting the 
FDA the authority to regulate medical devices. The Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) initially gave the FDA the 
ability to regulate medical devices.26 The passage of the Medical Device 
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) then broadened the FDA’s regulatory 
power to include ensuring that medical devices are safe and effective.27 
Taken together, the legislative history and language of these statutes 
demonstrates that the FDA’s responsibility to ensure medical device 
safety is limited to scientific inquiries into whether devices directly 
cause physical harm to consumers.28 
A. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
Prior to the passage of the FDCA, the FDA did not have 
jurisdiction over medical devices.29 Through the FDCA, Congress 
expanded the FDA’s authority by giving the agency the ability to 
regulate medical devices.30 The FDCA defined “medical device” as “an 
instrument, apparatus . . . [or] contrivance . . . including any 
component, part, or accessory . . . intended for use in the diagnosis . . . , 
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals; or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body 
of man or other animals.”31 Yet the FDA’s power to regulate these 
 
 26. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (2012)). 
 27. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 513, 90 Stat. 540, 540–46 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c).  
 28. This Part focuses on these two statutes because, for the purposes of this Note, they 
involve the most significant congressional changes to the FDA’s authority over medical devices. 
The FDCA was the first statute to give the FDA the authority to regulate medical devices, and 
the MDA amended the statute to include considerations of safety and effectiveness—the 
operative language analyzed in this Note. See infra Parts I.A and I.B.  
 29. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 only gave the FDA limited authority to regulate 
foods, drugs, and cosmetics. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 
768 (repealed 1938); Peter Barton Hutt, Esq., A History of Government Regulation of 
Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 100–01 (1989).  
 30. Id. at 102. 
 31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(h) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 
321(h)).  
BAIRD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  8:33 AM 
390  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:383 
devices was limited, as the agency could only take regulatory action 
against adulterated or misbranded medical devices after they were 
introduced into interstate commerce.32 
B. Medical Device Amendments of 1976 
Soon after the FDA gained jurisdiction over adulterated or 
misbranded devices, a proliferation of fraudulent devices flooded the 
market.33 Although the FDA brought successful postmarket actions 
against some of these products, keeping up with these devices strained 
its resources, and many lawmakers wanted to give the FDA broader 
authority to regulate medical devices more effectively.34 Starting in the 
1950s, Congress considered several changes to the FDCA that would 
expand the FDA’s power to assure the safety and effectiveness of new 
medical devices.35  
The major motivation for legislation expanding the FDA’s 
jurisdiction was the growing public and governmental consensus that 
the FDA should protect consumers from physically dangerous and 
fraudulent devices.36 For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson 
advocated for increased FDA regulatory authority over medical 
devices in his February 1967 consumer message.37 To bolster his 
argument, President Johnson mainly focused on examples of medical 
 
 32. Id. § 304 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 334). A device was deemed to be 
“adulterated” if it consisted of a filthy substance, had been prepared in unsanitary conditions, was 
composed of “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to 
health,” or if it differed from the quality stated in its labeling. Id. § 501 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. § 351). A device was deemed to be “misbranded” if its “labeling [was] false or 
misleading in any particular”; if it did not have a label containing certain information about the 
business, quantity of contents, and directions for use and warnings against misuse; or if it was 
“dangerous to health” when used according to the label. Id. § 502 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 352).  
 33. Hutt, supra note 29, at 105. 
 34. See id. at 104–05 (noting that the FDCA gave the FDA the authority to take “regulatory 
action against the adulteration or misbranding of medical devices” and describing the FDA’s 
response to the increase in fraudulent devices on the market after the passage of the FDCA).  
 35. See id. at 105–08 (chronicling congressional and executive efforts to expand the FDA’s 
authority).  
 36. See Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing 
Nonmedical “Devices” from Medical “Devices” Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
806, 820 (1993) (“The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 . . . passed only after many 
preventable tragedies outraged the public and Congress.”). 
 37. Special Message to the Congress To Protect the American Consumer (Feb. 16, 1967), in 
1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 196, 201 
(1968). 
BAIRD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  8:33 AM 
2017] DON’T TRY THIS AT HOME 391 
devices that caused direct physical harm to consumers.38 Although the 
1967 legislation did not pass, these arguments regarding physical safety 
were raised once more during the passage of the MDA. Both the 
House and Senate legislative reports also fixated on examples of unsafe 
devices that could cause consumers direct, physical harm.39  
The legislative reports demonstrate that Congress additionally 
wanted to give the FDA the authority to regulate “quack” or 
“fraudulent” devices.40 The description of the problems associated with 
these devices indicates that Congress wanted to regulate these products 
primarily because they were ineffective, rather than physically harmful 
and unsafe. For instance, the Senate report described a diagnostic 
service “based upon the theory that any ailment [could] be diagnosed 
by measuring [emanations] from a dried blood spot on sterile paper,” 
when, in fact, an investigation of these claims found that it was 
completely ineffective—it was “incapable of distinguishing the blood 
of animals or birds from that of man, or that of the living from the 
dead.”41 Thus, the issue with these devices was not that they posed a 
safety hazard, but rather, were fraudulent because they made false 
diagnostic or therapeutic claims. Regulation of such devices now falls 
under the FDA’s duty to ensure the “effectiveness” of medical 
devices.42 
 
 38. In particular, President Johnson cited “[d]efective nails and screws for bone repair [that] 
required repeated operations to correct the damage,” “artificial eyes” that caused “serious 
infection[s],” and x-ray machines that “emitted excessive doses of radiation.” Id. 
 39. In the House report, the section entitled “Background and Need for Legislation” pointed 
to the following examples as justification for giving the FDA premarket regulatory authority over 
certain medical devices: the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which was highly unsuccessful and 
linked to sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages by 1975; “[s]ignificant defects in cardiac 
pacemakers [that] have necessitated 34 voluntary recalls of pacemakers, involving 23,000 units, 
since 1972”; and intraocular lenses that seriously impaired eleven patients and caused the removal 
of the eye of five patients. H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8 (1976). Further, the House cited the findings 
of the Cooper Committee, which was convened by the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare in 1969 to evaluate alternatives for FDA device regulation. Id. at 9. The committee found 
in its extensive literature review that “10,000 injuries directly related to medical devices over a 
ten year period, of which 751 had proved fatal.” Id. The Senate report focused on similar issues 
in its section “History of Regulation of Medical Devices and Need for Legislation.” S. REP. NO. 
94-33, at 2–7 (1975). For instance, after noting that the need for the legislation was shown “by the 
history of several cases against unsafe devices undertaken by the FDA,” the report gave the 
example of weight loss devices that “aggravate[d] muscular, gastrointestinal, and other 
disorders.” Id. at 6. 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 6, 7 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 2–7 (1975). 
 41. S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 4, 5. 
 42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring that the FDA evaluate all medical devices 
to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device”). 
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Another concern motivating the legislation was “congressional 
and industry frustration with judicial manipulation of the FDCA 
allowing FDA to denominate as drugs many articles that were plainly 
devices.”43 Both the House and Senate reports on the MDA cited two 
court decisions in which the FDA successfully expanded its jurisdiction 
by blurring the line between drugs and devices.44 Accordingly, the 
MDA’s impetus was not only to expand the FDA’s jurisdiction over 
medical devices, but to also create clearer boundaries for the agency’s 
regulatory authority.  
The MDA significantly expanded the FDA’s regulatory authority 
over medical devices by creating a premarket approval process for new 
medical devices.45 The MDA required that the FDA evaluate all 
medical devices to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and 
effectiveness of the device,” and then classify them based on the level 
of risk that they present to consumers.46 The statute states that for the 
purpose of classifying the devices, the “safety and effectiveness of a 
device are to be determined—(A) with respect to the persons for 
whose use the device is represented or intended, (B) with respect to 
the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the 
labeling of the device, and (C) weighing any probable benefit to health 
 
 43. Gamerman, supra note 36, at 820–21.  
 44. H. R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8–9; S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 6 (pointing to the decisions in Amp, 
Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. An Article of Drug . . . Bacto-
Unidisk . . . ., 394 U.S. 784 (1969) where courts held, respectively, that a nylon suture and an 
antibiotic sensitivity disc were drugs instead of devices). “As a result of these decisions FDA 
classified as drugs soft contact lenses, a pregnancy kit, and intrauterine contraceptive devices 
which contain drugs or trace metals.” Id.  
 45. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 540, 552–59 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012)).  
 46. Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c). There are three applicable classes. 
Class I devices are considered low risk and are “subject to general controls.” Fekete, supra note 
12, at 610. General controls include: “adulterated and misbranded device prevention, registration 
of producers of devices . . . , and general provisions respecting control of devices intended for 
human use.” Id. at 611. Class II devices are considered moderate risk. They are “subject to special 
controls when general controls are not enough ‘to provide reasonable assurance of [the device’s] 
safety and effectiveness.’” Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2017)). “Special controls include 
‘performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries . . . guidelines . . . 
recommendations, and other appropriate actions that the [FDA] deems necessary.” Id. Class III 
devices are high-risk and “are subject to general controls as well as premarket approval.” Id. The 
premarket approval process requires the manufacturer to provide the FDA copious amounts of 
information about the device, including “clinical studies and information as to the device’s 
efficacy and safety.” Id. at 611–12.  
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from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness 
from such use.”47  
These instructions for device classification suggest two things. 
First, the inclusion of this language within the statute indicates that 
Congress intended to set boundaries for the FDA’s determination of 
the safety and effectiveness of a device, which suggests that Congress 
did not want to give the FDA absolute discretion over what constitutes 
valid safety and effectiveness considerations. Second, the use of the 
language “injury or illness from such use” in section C suggests that 
Congress only wanted the FDA to consider a device’s potential for 
direct, physical harm when determining safety; “injury or illness” 
connotes a tangible, physical impairment and “from such use” implies 
that the device directly caused the harm.48  
The statute also requires the FDA to use a specific device 
classification process: the FDA classifies a device after it receives a 
recommendation from a classification panel that has evaluated the 
device.49 The panel is comprised of “persons who are qualified by 
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the 
devices . . . and who, to the extent feasible, possess skill in the use of, 
or experience in the development, manufacture, or utilization of, such 
devices.”50 Further, the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ 
appointments to the panels must “consist of members with adequately 
diversified expertise in such fields as clinical and administrative 
medicine, engineering, biological and physical sciences, and other 
related professions.”51 This description suggests that individuals should 
have the scientific expertise to evaluate whether the device will 
physically harm consumers and if it will be effective in its claims.52  
Congress also expanded the medical device definition to include 
not only devices that diagnose diseases, but also those that diagnose 
“conditions.”53 Further, the MDA requires registration of device 
 
 47. Medical Device Amendments § 2(a)(2), 90 Stat. at 541 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360c(a)(2)) (emphasis added).  
 48. For further discussion of Congress’s intent to limit safety considerations to a device’s 
potential for causing direct, physical harm to consumers, see infra Part III.A.  
 49. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2)).  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. For a discussion of the FDA’s failure to utilize its scientific expertise in evaluating the 
safety of HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing devices, see infra Part III.B.2.  
 53. Medical Device Amendments § 2(a)(2). This addition was likely in response to United 
States v. OVA II, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the FDA unsuccessfully argued that it had 
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establishments,54 authorizes good manufacturing practice regulations,55 
and provides the FDA with the authority to ban a device that “presents 
substantial deception or an unreasonable and substantial risk of illness 
or injury.”56  
Although the final law “greatly strengthened the FDA’s authority 
to regulate medical devices,” Congress also wrote the MDA with the 
purpose of creating regulations that are “carefully tailored to the type 
of device involved.”57 Consequently, the classifying scheme and its 
reliance on independent advisory panels limited the FDA’s authority 
by requiring that it “place all medical devices into one of three 
regulatory classes based on the level of regulatory oversight actually 
needed to provide reasonable assurances of safety or efficacy.”58 
Moreover, several statements made during the House debates 
over the MDA suggest that at least some members of Congress were 
concerned about the FDA extending its jurisdiction over medical 
devices beyond the powers proposed in the legislation.59 In his 
comments on the House’s consideration of the conference report on 
the Senate’s bill, Representative Paul G. Rogers assured the body that 
the legislation was “carefully designed so that the least regulation 
necessary to assure safety and effectiveness will be applied to 
devices.”60 In a previous House debate over the MDA, Representative 
Mark Hannaford stated that although he had “become increasingly 
 
the authority to regulate a home pregnancy test kit as a drug. For a discussion of the OVA II 
decision, see infra Part II.A.  
 54. Medical Device Amendments § 4 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360); see Hutt, 
supra note 29, at 113 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA). Under these 
provisions, device manufacturers must register with the FDA, as well as abide by several 
administrative provisions regarding registration.   
 55. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360j); see Hutt, 
supra note 29, at 112–13 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA). 
 56. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360f); see Hutt, 
supra note 29, at 112–13 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA). 
 57. Hutt, supra note 29, at 113.  
 58. Gamerman, supra note 36, at 821.  
 59. See id. at 821–22 (“Congress voiced the fear that FDA, like most agencies, relentlessly 
would extend its jurisdiction and power beyond the newly expanded parameters.”). 
 60. 122 CONG. REC. 13,778 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rogers). In a previous discussion of 
the bill, Rep. Rogers made similar comments about Congress’s intent to narrowly tailor the 
FDA’s authority:  
What we have done is write a bill specific enough so that we just do not turn over to a 
bureaucracy and allow them to write whatever and however they want . . . . We have 
been specific because we believe the Congress should write the law specifically. The 
committee does not intend to allow regulatory agencies to do anything they want to.  
Id. at 5851.  
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concerned over the phenomenon of law by regulation during [his] term 
in Congress . . . . [The MDA bill] is a clear expression . . . permitting 
the FDA to implement the law, not write it.”61 Though these 
representatives do not speak for Congress as a whole, their statements 
indicate that several members of Congress raised the issue of limited 
FDA jurisdiction.  
Taken together, the legislative history of the MDA demonstrates 
that Congress wanted to limit the FDA’s authority to regulate medical 
devices according to their safety and effectiveness even as it expanded 
the FDA’s jurisdiction over these devices. Further, the statutory 
language suggests that considerations of safety and effectiveness 
should be limited to scientific inquiries based on the direct, physical 
harm that a device might pose to a consumer. Interpreting the statutory 
language as permitting the FDA to consider potential indirect, 
nonphysical harms undervalues the legislative context of the MDA and 
the statutory limitations that Congress placed on the FDA. If Congress 
wanted to give the FDA the discretion to consider those types of 
harms, it would have passed legislation with broader language that did 
not restrict the FDA’s processes for determining the classification, 
safety, and effectiveness of devices. Thus, the FDA only has the 
statutory authority to consider direct, physical harms to consumers in 
determining whether a device is safe.  
II.  INSTANCES OF FDA PATERNALISM IN EVALUATING THE SAFETY 
OF MEDICAL DEVICES 
On several occasions over the last forty years, the FDA has 
interpreted its statutory authority to regulate the safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices to include considerations of how 
consumers might react to the information provided by certain home-
testing products. The FDA’s attempted seizure of Ova II pregnancy 
tests, its ban on HIV home-test approval applications, and its intense 
scrutiny of DTC genetic testing demonstrate that the agency has 
repeatedly limited access to personal information based on concerns 
that are beyond the scope of its authority to consider the safety of new 
medical devices under the MDA. This Part provides an overview of the 
FDA’s regulatory actions on these three medical devices and analyzes 
the agency’s motivations for restricting consumer access to the 
information that the devices provide. 
 
 61. Id. at 5850 (statement of Rep. Hannaford). 
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A. Pregnancy Tests in the 1970s—Ova II  
In 1971, Faraday Laboratories began marketing home pregnancy 
test kits;62 advertisements in women’s magazines for the tests carried 
the slogan, “When you want to be the first to know.”63 The kit was 
available without a prescription64 and was “marketed with literature 
indicating its use for the purpose of performing, in the home, a 
‘preliminary screening test’” for pregnancy.65 It contained “two glass 
vials and two bottles of solutions.”66 To complete the test, the user 
would mix a urine sample with the two solutions in two separate vials, 
combining different numbers of solution drops, in different time 
sequences, in each vial.67 Women could tell whether they were 
pregnant based on “the presence or absence of distinct visual 
differences in the darkness” of the two vials.68 The test was identical to 
those used in laboratories and “it purported to be reasonably accurate 
in the determination of pregnancy even when used by laypeople.”69 
Some heralded the tests as an important advancement in the women’s 
health movement, as they gave women greater control over and access 
to important medical information.70 
Consumer access to the Ova II testing kit was short lived—on 
December 12, 1972, the FDA announced that it was recalling the 
product because it believed that the kits were “inaccurate, unreliable 
and prone to give false results.”71 Although the “reliability or safety” 
of the tests were not questioned when they were being used by 
laboratories, the FDA thought the kit was “unreliable” in the hands of 
laywomen.72  
A representative from Faraday countered that the company’s tests 
showed that the tests were “accurate and [reliable] when used as 
 
 62. Robinson, supra note 20, at 654. 
 63. Lyons, supra note 18. 
 64. Id. 
 65. United States v. Article of Drug . . . Ova II (Ova II), 414 F. Supp. 660, 622 (D.N.J. 1975), 
aff’d, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 66. Id. at 662–63. The two solutions were hydrochloric acid (HCI) and sodium hydroxide 
(NaOH). Id. at 663. 
 67. Id. at 663.  
 68. Id. “Distinct differences of color” meant “not pregnant” while “essentially similar color 
and saturation indicate[d] pregnancy.” Id. 
 69. Robinson, supra note 20, at 654.  
 70. See id. at 658 (noting that some medical professionals expressed their support for home 
pregnancy tests “with language of knowledge, information, confidentiality, control, and choices”).  
 71. Lyons, supra note 18 (quoting the FDA’s statement).  
 72. Robinson, supra note 20, at 657. 
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directed.”73 The company initially agreed to recall the kits, but 
questioned the FDA’s authority to recall the product because it was 
not a drug.74 At this point, the MDA was not yet in effect and the FDA 
only had postmarket regulatory authority over adulterated or 
misbranded devices that were related to disease or affected the 
structure or function of the body.75 
In 1974, Faraday stopped complying with the FDA’s recall76 and 
filed suit in federal court in the District of New Jersey against the 
FDA.77 The court did not decide whether Ova II was “safe and 
effective,” but rather considered whether the FDA had the authority 
to regulate the testing kit as a drug under the statutory language.78 The 
court granted Faraday’s motion for summary judgment79 because 
“[t]he condition of pregnancy . . . is a normal physiological function of 
all mammals and cannot be considered a disease of itself.”80 Further, 
the judge noted that “no pregnancy test . . . is fully 100% reliable, and 
even if they were 100% reliable would disclose no more than that 
pregnancy exists or does not exist.”81 Accordingly, all pregnancy-
related ailments or diseases cannot be considered in conjunction with 
the pregnancy test kits because those conditions “have other 
symptoms” and “must be separately diagnosed.”82  
The court in Ova II also clarified some distinctions about the 
consideration of medical devices. First, the court signaled that the FDA 
cannot hold a manufacturer to an impossible standard of reliability by 
noting that “no pregnancy test, including those recognized by FDA as 
not only ‘safe and effective’ but also considered by it as the most ‘safe 
 
 73. Lyons, supra note 18. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 304, 52 Stat. 1040, 1044 
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). Prior to the MDA, devices were defined as 
“instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, 
intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man 
or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other 
animals.” Id. § 201(h). The FDA likely thought that it could successfully characterize the testing 
kits as a drug because the Supreme Court had recently ruled that the Bacto-Unidisk, which was a 
testing disc for the effectiveness of various antibiotics in treating an infection, was a “drug” under 
the FDCA. See United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 785 (1969). 
 76. Robinson, supra note 20, at 656. 
 77. Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976).  
 78. Id. at 662. 
 79. Id. at 667. 
 80. Id. at 664. 
 81. Id.   
 82. Id.  
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and effective’ (a quality not required by the Act), is fully 100% 
reliable.”83 Given that these kits used the same mechanisms as those 
used in laboratory tests, it is unclear why Ova II would have been 
dangerous for lay use if “error rates were simply disclosed with the 
device.”84 Further, the court correctly narrowed the scope of its inquiry 
into Ova II: it would only consider the conditions for which the test is 
indicated and not make determinations based on scenarios in which 
women might use the pregnancy test result to make decisions about 
separate pregnancy-related or other medical issues.85 This distinction is 
important because the court likely recognized that many of the FDA’s 
concerns over the testing kits were related to issues outside of the scope 
of the test’s limited use.  
Ultimately, the court’s determination that the FDA could not 
impose premarket regulations on Ova II because it did not fit under 
the definition of a drug became moot after Congress passed the MDA, 
expanding the FDA’s premarket authority to include medical devices 
that diagnose “conditions.”86 But the motivations underlying the 
FDA’s actions in its attempt to regulate Ova II have not changed. In 
this instance, the FDA was likely trying to expand its jurisdiction over 
medical devices—which at the time only encompassed adulterated and 
misbranded products—because of its concerns for the welfare of 
women when using home pregnancy tests. Although there is little 
direct evidence about the FDA’s motivations behind its recall of Ova 
II,87 the circumstantial evidence outlined above suggests that the FDA 
wanted to restrict women’s access to this information and keep these 
identical pregnancy tests in the hands of laboratories.  
B. HIV Home-Testing 
The FDA’s attempts to limit access to information based on the 
notion that the agency needed to protect consumers from their own 
 
 83. Id.  
 84. Robinson, supra note 20, at 657. 
 85. See Ova II, 414 F. Supp. at 664 (“[Pregnancy-related ailments] must be separately 
diagnosed. Neither Ova II nor any other pregnancy test attempts to do so. . . . [H]ere, the fact that 
there may be ailments or diseases related to pregnancy or associated with it is not an element that 
may be considered.”). 
 86. For a description of the expansion of the device definition under the MDA, see supra 
notes 53–61 and accompanying text. 
 87. The FDA’s website does not contain any information or documents regarding this 
seizure. Further, neither the Clerk's Office for the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey nor the National Archives could produce a copy of the Ova II case record. Thus, the 
only resources I was able to find regarding this case are those provided in this Section.  
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potentially negative reactions did not end with Ova II. During the 
HIV/AIDS crisis in the late 1980s, the FDA took a hard stance against 
HIV home-testing, in large part because of its concern that consumers 
would not be able to handle test results constructively. 
Although the FDA was considering premarket approval 
applications for home HIV tests in 1986 and 1987,88 it halted this 
development in March 1988 and decided to limit applications to blood 
collection kits that were “intended for professional use only.”89 The 
FDA made this ban official in a guidance published in the Federal 
Register in February 1989.90 This move effectively banned 
consideration of any applications for HIV home-test kits, as one of the 
criteria for applications was that they must be “labeled and marketed 
for professional use only within a health care environment (e.g., 
hospitals, medical clinics, doctor’s offices, sexually transmitted disease 
clinics, HIV–1 counseling and testing centers, and mental health 
clinics[)].”91 Thus, manufacturers of HIV home-testing kits were not 
allowed to demonstrate that their products were safe and effective 
because the FDA would not consider their applications for premarket 
approval.92  
Although the FDA had several issues with home HIV tests,93 its 
notice for a public meeting on the subject in February 1989 indicates 
that it was concerned about consumers’ ability to understand and react 
safely to test results. The FDA set up a public forum to discuss its ban 
and the two types of home-testing kits: “blood collection kits,” which 
instructed consumers to send their blood samples to the testing 
company, and “[k]its for [c]ollection and [h]ome [t]esting of [b]lood for 
[e]vidence of HIV–1 [i]nfection,” which allowed consumers to test 
their own specimens.94 Regarding blood collection kits, the FDA noted 
 
 88. Salbu, supra note 21, at 407.  
 89. Blood Collection Kits Labeled for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1) 
Antibody Testing; Home Kits Designed to Detect HIV-1 Antibody; Open Meeting, 54 Fed. Reg. 
7279, 7280 (Feb. 17, 1989) [hereinafter HIV Testing Meeting].  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id.  
 92. Salbu, supra note 21, at 452–53. 
 93. The FDA made arguments for banning home HIV tests other than its concerns about 
consumer reactions. For instance, one FDA spokesperson explained that “refusal to consider 
applications of HIV home tests was based on several concerns, including the potentially improper 
drawing of blood samples, the possibility of blood samples being held for long periods of time, 
and the potential for blood samples to be affected by temperature changes during in-mail transit.” 
Salbu, supra note 21, at 407. 
 94. HIV Testing Meeting, supra note 89, at 7280–81. 
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that medical experts believed that HIV testing should include 
counseling for test results and solicited comments “regarding the 
ability to provide effective pre- and post-test counseling in a setting 
outside the health care environment.”95 For combination collection and 
testing kits, the FDA invited comments as to “whether laypersons can 
adequately interpret the test results, and whether that interpretation in 
the absence of a medical professional is appropriate.”96 Although the 
FDA listed other issues for the public meeting,97 its concern for 
laypersons’ ability to understand and respond to their own results 
without professional oversight suggests that its ban on HIV hometest 
applications was informed, at least in part, by the view that consumers 
needed to be protected from receiving this information outside of a 
clinical setting.  
Testimony from the FDA’s open meeting on this issue also 
demonstrates that the agency relied on concerns about consumer 
reactions instead of scientific data about the safety and effectiveness of 
HIV home-testing kits. The FDA revealed that at least seventeen 
companies indicated that they were interested in marketing HIV 
home-testing kits, which would require individuals to send blood or 
saliva samples for testing.98 The FDA acknowledged the existence of 
technology that allowed a person to do the entire test at home even 
though no company had yet developed the test.99 The expert opinions 
presented at the meeting were mixed.100 The Vice President of the 
Hudson Institute—a public policy think tank that conducted some 
HIV/AIDS research101—urged the FDA to consider the home tests 
 
 95. Id. at 7281. 
 96. Id. 
 97. For blood collection kits, the FDA also asked for comments on the “[c]ollection and 
shipping of blood samples by laypersons,” the “[r]eturn of test results directly to the person from 
whom the sample was collected,” and the “[a]vailability of blood collection systems.” Id. at 7280–
81. For combination collecting and testing kits, the agency asked for comments on “whether the 
kits should be made available OTC, [and] whether laypersons can reliably and safely perform the 
test.” Id. at 7281. 
 98. Rebecca Kolberg, A Public Policy Expert Charged Thursday Government Inaction 
on . . ., UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 6, 1989), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/04/06/A-public-
policy-expert-charged-Thursday-government-inaction-on/3140607838400 [https://perma.cc/
26DR-UNVU].  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See Philip M. Boffey, Research Group Says AIDS Cases May Be Twice the U.S. Estimate, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/20/us/research-group-says-aids-
cases-may-be-twice-the-us-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/XBT9-XVX7] (discussing the Hudson 
Institute’s research). In fact, in 1988, the Hudson Institute estimated that President Reagan’s 
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immediately, arguing that “[t]o continue to prohibit it (home AIDS 
testing) is to condemn some Americans to death as [a] result of 
inadvertent transmission of HIV.”102 On the other hand, a 
representative from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) argued 
that the tests could cause “all types of heartache,” as “people who test 
positive or even falsely positive for HIV may react in hysterical or 
irrational ways, such as committing suicide, while those who test falsely 
negative may wrongly consider themselves ‘resistant’ to the deadly 
virus and continue high-risk behaviors.”103 The Deputy Director of the 
federal Center for Disease Controls’ AIDS program expressed concern 
about the effectiveness of the companies’ telephone counseling.104  
Despite the Hudson Institute’s urging for greater access to this 
technology, the FDA did not relax its guidelines for HIV-testing 
applications until several years later.105 Although the testimony from 
opponents of home-testing did not represent the FDA’s official 
position, the focus on shielding consumers from important medical 
information and the FDA’s refusal to reconsider its restrictions suggest 
that these concerns prevailed over considerations of the device’s 
scientific, analytical validity.106 There is also evidence that the FDA was 
pressured by a powerful political coalition—including groups such as 
the American Medical Association and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, several members of Congress, and gay rights 
activists—that opposed home-testing applications because “they might 
be inaccurate or increase the risk of suicide.”107 The FDA’s decision to 
take a strong, prophylactic measure against this technology by refusing 
 
AIDS commission was underestimating the total number of Americans infected with AIDS, as 
well as the number of infected heterosexuals. Id. 
 102. Kolberg, supra note 98. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Home Specimen Collection Kit Systems Intended for Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
(HIV-1 and/or HIV-2) Antibody Testing; Revisions to Previous Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,087 
(Feb. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Revisions to Previous Guidance].  
 106. This Note does not analyze whether the FDA’s assumption that HIV test results have a 
high likelihood of eliciting negative reactions was correct, but rather demonstrates that the FDA 
relied on this consideration when it banned HIV home-testing applications. Further, this Note 
argues in Part III.B.2 that restricting access to this information interferes with the consumer’s 
autonomy to weigh the potential risks and benefits of seeking personal health information like 
HIV status—regardless of potential reactions. 
 107. Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Home Testing for HIV, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 437, 
438 (2006). It appears that the fear of harmful reactions was prevalent in these arguments, as 
“AIDS activists reinforced the latter point by distributing copies of the obituary of a man who 
had jumped off the Golden Gate Bridge after learning that he was HIV-positive.” Id.  
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to consider premarket applications for these devices makes it apparent 
that the FDA gave substantial weight to the notion that it needed to 
protect consumers from their own medical information.108 In fact, the 
FDA openly acknowledged its concerns throughout the public 
comment process, and the director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics 
Evaluation and Research admitted during the public meeting that the 
agency “took a conservative view” of its considerations of HIV home-
testing kits.109 
In April of 1990, the FDA hinted that it might begin considering 
applications for home-testing kits, but then reaffirmed the 1989 
guidance limiting applications to tests for “professional use.”110 In 1994, 
three companies that had previously sought premarket approval for 
home tests sent new applications to the FDA, requesting that the 
agency reconsider the ban.111 The FDA convened an advisory panel to 
consider the issue “[i]n light of scientific and technological 
developments and the changing nature of the HIV epidemic.”112 This 
time, the majority of the advisory committee members “believed that 
the potential benefits of over-the-counter (OTC) home specimen 
collection kits outweighed the potential risks.”113 Afterward, the FDA 
issued a guidance in February 1995 that lifted the ban on applications 
for home-specimen-collection testing kits.114 Although the ban reversal 
was a victory for device manufacturers, the FDA still placed several 
burdensome guidelines on the approval of these devices. For instance, 
applications had to show that test results would be given to consumers 
by “persons appropriately trained in HIV notification and counseling” 
and that consumers with positive results would receive counseling that 
referred them to “medical and social support services” in their 
community.115  
Although the FDA cited “scientific and technological 
developments and the changing nature of the HIV epidemic” as 
 
 108. For a discussion of the specific provisions of the FDA’s ban on HIV home-test 
applications, see supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.  
 109. Kolberg, supra note 98. 
 110. Blood Collection Kits Labeled for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV-1) Antibody 
Testing; Availability of Letter for Interested Persons, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,982, 30,982 (July 30, 1990).  
 111. Salbu, supra note 21, at 411. 
 112. Revisions to Previous Guidance, supra note 105, at 10,087.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 10,088 
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reasons for reconsidering its ban on specimen-collection kits,116 few 
developments had occurred during the previous five years.117 The 
importance of diagnostic tools in the fight against HIV had not 
changed—the scientific community knew when the ban was imposed 
that “avoidance of new infection [was] the only method” available for 
curbing the number of HIV-related deaths.118 Additionally, although 
the companies interested in marketing this product continued to 
develop HIV-testing technology during the ban, they were repeatedly 
denied the ability to show that the tests were safe and effective.119 In 
fact, the former president of a company that sought approval for an 
HIV home-testing kit testified that when his company presented their 
product for final approval in 1994, they used “essentially the same 
data” they took to the FDA in 1987—the year they first applied for 
premarket approval.120  
Thus, the FDA’s blanket ban on both types of home-testing 
products from 1988 to 1994 was not primarily based on scientific data 
on the safety and effectiveness of these devices.121 Rather, the products 
were “considered unacceptable in principle” because the FDA was 
concerned about the potential ramifications of consumers having 
access to this information.122 The application process could have given 
companies—who had the technology for home-testing kits years before 
applications were accepted—the chance to show that concerns about 
consumer reactions were not supported by scientific studies.123 Instead, 
the manufacturers were denied this opportunity until the FDA decided 
that it would consider their data for approval. In fact, the FDA did not 
lift its ban on applications for combination home collection and testing 
kits (or “rapid home” tests) until seventeen years later in 2005.124 
Although at least one company submitted an application for approval 
 
 116. Id. at 10,087.  
 117. Salbu, supra note 21, at 452.  
 118. Id.   
 119. Id. at 452–53.  
 120. FDA BLOOD PRODS. ADVISORY COMM., TESTIMONY OF ELLIOTT J. MILLENSON, 
FORMER PRESIDENT & CEO, J&J/DIRECT ACCESS DIAGNOSTICS (2006), http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/06/slides/2006-4206OPH2_2b.htm [https://perma.cc/SLE2-L6NB].  
 121. Salbu, supra note 21, at 453.  
 122. Id. 
 123. See Parloff, supra note 23 (suggesting that the FDA could have allowed research to 
determine if the “apprehensions surrounding home testing were empirically justified”). 
 124. Id. 
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of a rapid home test in 1987, the FDA did not approve the first rapid 
home HIV test until twenty-five years later in 2012.125   
C. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing 
Around the same time that the FDA loosened restrictions on HIV 
rapid tests, it began to increase its enforcement efforts against another 
form of medical information: DTC genetic tests. Companies started to 
offer DTC genetic testing services in 2007.126 In May 2010, the FDA 
started regulating these devices.127 After Pathway Genomics 
announced that it was partnering with Walgreens to sell its home-
testing kit in over 6,000 stores throughout the United States,128 the 
FDA sent the company an Untitled Letter.129 In the letter, the FDA 
noted that the company’s kit “intended to report customary and 
personal genetic health disposition results for more than 70 health 
conditions” for the purpose of creating a “health regime to live a 
healthier, longer life.”130 Further, the FDA noted that the kit 
“appear[ed] to meet the definition of a device” under the FDCA, but 
the company did not have preclearance or approval for it.131 As a result, 
Walgreens eventually cancelled the plan, and Pathway returned to 
selling the test online, but only giving results to physicians.132 
The FDA then ramped up its surveillance of DTC genetic testing 
companies. A month after the Pathway letter, the FDA sent Untitled 
Letters to five additional companies, following the same line of 
 
 125. Id.  
 126. Green & Farahany, supra note 2, at 286. 
 127. Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulation Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 705 (2014). 
 128. Id.  
 129. The FDA uses two types of letters to notify companies of violations: Warning and 
Untitled Letters. Warning Letters alert the company of “violations that may lead to enforcement 
action.” Id. at 704. Untitled Letters are used for “less significant violations.” Id. 
 130. Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir. of Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In 
Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food 
& Drug Admin., to James Plante, Founder & CEO, Pathway Genomics Corp. (May 10, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM211875.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X5BG-PWRP]. Pathway Genomics’ health claims do not affect this Note’s 
subsequent analysis of the FDA’s authority to regulate these types of tests based on concerns 
about consumer reactions. The decisions that consumers make in response to the tests—including 
those regarding their “health regime”—are secondary to the device’s purpose to provide 
information. For a discussion of how consumer reactions are separate from the device’s purpose, 
see infra notes 245–49 and accompanying text. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 127, at 706. 
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reasoning.133 In July of 2010, Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the FDA’s 
Center for Device and Radiological Health provided congressional 
testimony about the agency’s decision to intervene in DTC genetic 
testing.134 His testimony indicates that the FDA had several concerns 
about consumers receiving this type of information: “Marketing 
genetic tests directly to consumers can increase the risk of a test 
because a patient may make a decision that adversely affects their 
health, such as stopping or changing the dose of a medication or 
continuing an unhealthy lifestyle, without the intervention of a learned 
intermediary.”135 Shuren also noted that the six DTC companies that 
the FDA contacted had not “submitted information on the analytical 
or clinical validity of their tests to FDA for clearance or approval.”136 
These statements show the FDA’s initial regulation of DTC genetic 
testing was motivated in part by concerns about its clinical validity.137 
The FDA “sent similar letters to 15 other firms marketing DTC genetic 
tests” in July 2010138 and three final Untitled Letters in May 2011.139 
In March 2011, the FDA convened a meeting of the Molecular and 
Clinical Genetics Panel to “discuss and make recommendations on 
scientific issues concerning direct to consumer (DTC) genetic tests that 
make medical claims.”140 It seems that the panel was concerned with 
guarding the public from what it considered potentially harmful 
information, as the participants considered the benefits and risks of 
making these services available without physician supervision. The 
report noted that the panelists had different opinions as to whether the 
“risks outweigh the benefits of offering this category of tests DTC.”141 
Further, the participants “generally agreed” that they should 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing & the Consequences to the Public Health: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 
111th Cong. 79 (2010) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, M.D., Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological 
Health, Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. For an explanation of the FDA's expansive definition of clinical validity in the 23andMe 
context, see supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 127, at 710. 
 140. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., SUMMARY OF THE MOLECULAR & CLINICAL 
GENETICS PANEL MEETING (Mar. 8–9, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/MedicalDevices/MedicalDevicesAdvisoryCommitte
e/MolecularandClinicalGeneticsPanel/UCM246907.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5CG-MZUX]. 
 141. Id. 
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recommend that certain types of genetic tests only be offered upon 
prescription.142 In considering potential “mitigations against incorrect, 
misinterpreted, miscommunicated, or misunderstood test results” for 
tests offered without live counseling sessions, panel members had the 
following suggestions: first, providing patient training and education; 
second, utilizing a “knowledge test prior to providing the DTC clinical 
genetic test to assess whether the consumer understands the meaning 
or consequences of test results”; and third, requiring that companies 
provide “qualified genetic counselors” to consumers.143 These 
considerations by the panel confirm that the FDA premised a 
substantial part of its concern over DTC genetic testing on its notion 
that it had a duty to protect consumers from receiving this information 
on their own, lest consumers react negatively without professional 
help.  
Although 23andMe was going through the process of gaining 
premarket clearance for its health-related tests in 2012, the FDA sent 
a strongly worded Warning Letter to the company in November 2013, 
effectively withdrawing its applications.144 The FDA ordered the 
company to “immediately discontinue marketing” the services and 
seek premarket approval as a Class III device.145 The 23andMe 
Warning Letter used concerns about consumer reactions to test results 
to rationalize the regulation, rather than legitimate safety 
considerations about direct, physical harm.146 The FDA found that 
some of the kits’ uses were “particularly concerning,” and cited the 
possibility that consumers could use their testing results to self-manage 
their medical conditions or discontinue therapies, as well as overreact 
and undergo radical, unnecessary treatments.147 The FDA also noted 
that 23andMe needed to provide assurance that it had “analytically” 
 
 142. The report said that the following categories should be prescription only: “pre-
symptomatic tests with high predictor for a disease, with potentially severe consequences, and 
pharmacogenetic tests.” Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3.  
 145. Id.  
 146. For a discussion of the FDA’s concerns outlined in the 23andMe Warning Letter, see 
supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.  
 147. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3. The Warning Letter explained that “patients 
relying on such tests may begin to self-manage their treatments through dose changes or even 
abandon certain therapies . . . .” Further, it noted that consumers who receive a false positive 
result for the gene for breast or ovarian cancer could “undergo prophylactic surgery, 
chemoprevention, intensive screening, or other morbidity-inducing actions.” Id.  
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and “clinically validated” the tests for their intended uses.148 The 
FDA’s persistent reliance on consumer responses as a rationale for 
regulating DTC genetic testing devices demonstrates that it includes 
these considerations in its evaluation of clinical validity.  
Despite the FDA’s approval of some DTC genetic tests, it 
continues to impose severe restrictions on consumers’ access to their 
genetic information based on concerns about consumer reactions to 
results. In 2015, approximately eighteen months after the 23andMe 
Warning Letter, the FDA approved the company’s carrier test for 
Bloom syndrome.149 The process for seeking this approval was quite 
burdensome. In addition to studies focused on ensuring analytical 
validity, 23andMe performed two studies demonstrating clinical 
validity: one “usability study,” which indicated that “consumers could 
understand the test instructions and collect an adequate saliva sample,” 
and one user study “to show the test instructions and results were easy 
to follow and understand” for a diverse set of participants.150  
The FDA also announced that it was classifying DTC carrier 
screening tests as Class II devices, which do not require premarket 
review.151 23andMe received approval for thirty-six carrier tests, 
including cystic fibrosis, later that year.152 The FDA likely granted 
carrier screenings a regulatory carve out because it believed that 
consumers are unlikely to react negatively to results; carrier screenings 
do not implicate “the acute anxiety of personal disease risk” because 
the primary concern is whether the person might pass along the gene 
to children.153  
 
 148. Id. For an explanation of analytical and clinical validity, see supra note 10 and 
accompanying text. 
 149. FDA Permits Marking of First Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Carrier Test for Bloom 
Syndrome, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm435003.htm [https://perma.cc/6JCA-VWT3]. “Individuals 
born with Bloom Syndrome experience stunted growth, rarely reaching five feet in height and are 
very light-sensitive and predisposed to cancer such that life expectancy is in the 20s.” David Kroll, 
FDA Approves 23andMe Gene Carrier Test, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/davidkroll/2015/02/19/fda-okays-23andmes-direct-to-consumer-gene-carrier-testing-
starting-with-bloom-syndrome/#152661d83791 [https://perma.cc/9J3C-AC38].  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Erika Check Hayden, Out of Regulatory Limbo, 23andMe Resumes Some Health Tests 
and Hopes to Offer More, NATURE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/out-of-
regulatory-limbo-23andme-resumes-some-health-tests-and-hopes-to-offer-more-1.18641 
[https://perma.cc/8P5T-DVX3].  
 153. Kroll, supra note 149.  
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On April 6, 2017, the FDA announced that after nearly four years 
of consideration, it approved ten of 23andMe’s genetic tests for 
diseases or conditions.154 The agency acknowledged that these tests are 
the first DTC genetic tests approved by the FDA that “provide 
information on an individual’s genetic predisposition to certain 
medical diseases or conditions, which may help to make decisions 
about lifestyle choices or to inform discussions with a health care 
professional.”155 Further, the FDA noted that it reviewed data for the 
tests through the de novo premarket review pathway, which it 
described as “a regulatory pathway for novel, low-to-moderate-risk 
devices that are not substantially equivalent to an already legally 
marketed device.”156  
Although this announcement seems like a significant 
accomplishment for 23andMe, the FDA’s consideration of the clinical 
validity of these tests demonstrates that the agency is still regulating 
DTC genetic tests in light of concerns about potential consumer actions 
taken in response to test results. The FDA noted that 23andMe’s tests 
were only approved after the company demonstrated their analytical 
and clinical validity.157 In regards to clinical validity, the FDA required 
that “the results of all DTC tests used for medical purposes be 
communicated in a way that consumers can understand and use.”158 
Although the FDA stated that the genetic information might help 
consumers make “lifestyle choices,” it also noted that results “should 
not be used for diagnosis or to inform treatment decisions.”159 
Further, the FDA indicated in the approval announcement that it 
is reconsidering its evaluation process for genetic health risk (GHR) 
tests. The FDA noted that it is “establishing criteria, called special 
controls, which clarify the agency’s expectations in assuring the tests’ 
accuracy, reliability and clinical relevance.”160 These special controls 
would supplement general controls required by FDA regulations, and 
would “provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness for 
these and similar GHR tests.”161 The FDA also vaguely alluded to 
 
 154. 23andMe Approval Announcement, supra note 13.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. Accordingly, 23andMe conducted a user study showing that “people using the tests 
understood more than 90 percent of the information presented in the reports.” Id. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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making the approval process easier in the future: the agency noted that 
it “intend[ed] to exempt additional 23andMe GHR tests from the 
FDA’s premarket review, and GHR tests from other makers may be 
exempt after submitting their first premarket notification.”162 Although 
the FDA did not give any further details on this potential exemption, 
it appears that this regulatory pathway would only apply to tests that 
have already been analytically and clinically verified, as the FDA also 
stated that the proposed exemption would “allow other, similar tests to 
enter the market as quickly as possible and in the least burdensome 
way, after a one-time FDA review.”163 
Although the approval announcements for the carrier genes and 
GHR tests seem like victories for consumer access to DTC genetic 
testing, they do not signify a major shift in the FDA’s regulatory 
approach for these devices because the agency has demonstrated that 
it is still concerned about the clinical decisions that consumers might 
make after receiving genetic test results. In fact, the FDA noted in the 
GHR tests announcement that the newly proposed “special controls” 
for assuring safety and effectiveness will include agency expectations 
for “clinical relevance.”164 This appears to encompass the same 
considerations as the FDA’s expansive formulation of clinical validity 
for DTC genetic testing—which includes considerations of consumer 
responses to test results—because “relevance” connotes test result 
usage for clinical decisionmaking.  
The FDA also stated in the GHR tests announcement that the 
recent authorization and “any future, related exemption” for GHR 
tests excluded “tests that function as diagnostic tests.”165 The FDA 
explained that these tests are “often used as the sole basis for major 
treatment decisions, such as a genetic test for BRCA, for which a 
positive result may lead to prophylactic (preventative) surgical 
removal of breasts or ovaries.”166 Unsurprisingly then, along with the 
thirty-six carrier tests authorized in 2015, the FDA has only approved 
ten out of the company’s original 240 health condition tests after nearly 
four years of FDA consideration.167 Thus, despite its recent 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Amy Maxmen, 23andMe Given Green Light To Sell DNA Tests for 10 Diseases, 
NATURE (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nature.com/news/23andme-given-green-light-to-sell-dna-
tests-for-10-diseases-1.21802 [https://perma.cc/UFE9-J7UB]. 
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authorizations for ten disease risk tests, the FDA’s approval process 
and exclusion of genetic tests that could provide consumers important 
medical information indicates that it is still concerned about how 
consumers will use test results.  
The current approval regime for DTC genetic testing reflects the 
continuation of the FDA’s expansive interpretation of its duty to 
ensure the safety of devices under the MDA. The FDA’s swift, strict 
regulation of DTC genetic testing and its characterizations of these 
services indicate that it has broadened its inquiries into these devices 
to include concerns about what consumers will do with results. The 
FDA appears to fear that consumers are not only unable to understand 
genetic testing results, but are also at risk of drastically changing their 
physician-guided treatment plans or undergoing unnecessary and 
dangerous procedures.  
Regulatory restrictions that require DTC genetic testing 
companies to demonstrate the FDA’s broad definition of clinical 
validity go beyond the scope of Congress’s intent to limit the FDA’s 
consideration of “safety” to the relevant scientific evidence of whether 
a device might cause physical harm.168 Certainly, the FDA may 
consider the tests’ accuracy in detecting genetic traits, but this inquiry 
does not encompass considerations of how consumers will react to 
certain results.169 Accordingly, the FDA’s rationale for setting 
burdensome restrictions on DTC genetic testing services is identical to 
its motivations for the seizure of the Ova II pregnancy tests and the 
ban on HIV home-testing kit applications—in all three instances, the 
FDA restricted individual access to personal medical information 
based on concerns about how people would respond to such 
information.  
III.  CONSIDERATIONS OF CONSUMER REACTIONS ARE OUTSIDE 
THE SCOPE OF THE FDA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND 
EXPERTISE 
The FDA’s actions regarding the Ova II pregnancy tests, HIV 
home-testing kits, and DTC genetic testing kits demonstrate that the 
FDA has repeatedly justified restrictions on access to personal medical 
information out of concern for how consumers might react to such 
 
 168. For a discussion of the FDA’s statutory authority to consider the “safety” of medical 
devices under the MDA, see infra Part III.A.  
 169. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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knowledge. Because the FDA was not constrained by the language of 
“safety and effectiveness” under the MDA when it recalled the Ova II 
pregnancy tests, this Part focuses on and analyzes the FDA’s 
restrictions on HIV home-testing kits and DTC genetic testing.  
The FDA’s consideration of the actions consumers might take 
after receiving test results greatly expands its authority to evaluate the 
safety of medical devices. This expansion is untenable for two reasons. 
First, the FDA lacks the authority to consider these types of potential 
harms because the meaning of “safety” in the MDA is clear—it only 
includes considerations of scientific evidence that the device directly 
causes physical harm to consumers.170 Second, the courts should not 
defer to the FDA’s broad interpretation of “safety,” which includes 
potential nondirect, nonphysical harms. The FDA is not entitled to 
deference in these cases because it did not use its expertise when it took 
regulatory action; even though the FDA is a scientific agency, its safety 
concerns for these devices were not supported by scientific inquiries. 
Further, as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the power to 
make value judgments for consumers about whether they can handle 
receiving information about their own bodies. 
A. The Term “Safety” Is Limited to Scientific Inquiries into the 
Potential for Direct, Physical Harm to Consumers 
Whether a statutory provision has a clear meaning can be part of 
a court’s deference analysis.171 The statutory language, structure of the 
MDA, and legislative history demonstrate that the meaning of “safety” 
is clear—Congress intended to limit the FDA’s consideration of safety 
to scientific inquiries about a device’s potential to cause direct physical 
harm to consumers.172  
First, Congress’s inclusion of instructions for determining safety 
and effectiveness indicates that it intended to limit the FDA’s 
discretion in considering these two requirements for medical devices.173 
 
 170. For a discussion of how the legislative history and language of the MDA demonstrates 
Congress’s intent to limit the FDA’s safety considerations, see supra Part I.B. 
 171. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Under 
the first step of the Chevron test, the court determines “whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue.” If congressional intent is clear, the agency must follow this 
expressed intent. Id. 
 172. For a discussion of the language, structure, and legislative history of the MDA, see supra 
Part I.B.  
 173. For a discussion of the MDA’s instructions for determining safety and effectiveness, see 
supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.   
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The language “risk of injury or illness from use” further suggests that 
Congress only wanted the FDA to investigate devices’ potential for 
directly causing physical harm in its safety determinations.174 Second, 
the MDA’s structural limitations for the FDA’s consideration of 
“safety and effectiveness” demonstrate that the agency is limited to 
conducting scientific inquiries; the agency must consider 
recommendations from classification panels which, the statute 
suggests, are comprised of individuals who have the scientific expertise 
to evaluate the “safety and effectiveness” of devices.175  
Finally, the historical record shows that the then-growing need for 
FDA regulation of physically dangerous and fraudulent products 
motivated Congress to expand the FDA’s jurisdiction to include an 
investigation into the “safety and effectiveness” of medical devices.176 
Both the House and Senate reports on the bill extensively cited unsafe 
devices that directly caused physical harm to consumers.177 The 
descriptions within these reports indicate that the “safety” prong of the 
FDA’s mandate was meant to give the agency the authority to protect 
consumers from these dangers. Further, the “effectiveness” prong was 
intended to help the FDA weed out fraudulent or quack devices 
making false diagnostic or therapeutic promises.178 Additionally, 
Congress’s concern over the FDA’s attempts to expand its jurisdiction 
over devices, highlighted in both legislative reports, suggests that 
Congress wanted to create boundaries for the agency’s regulatory 
authority.179 In fact, two members of Congress echoed this concern and 
praised the MDA because it sufficiently tailored the FDA’s jurisdiction 
over devices.180 Although these statements cannot definitively speak 
for Congress’s intent, they suggest that Congress considered the issue 
of limiting the FDA’s authority. 
 
 174. For a discussion of the statutory provision that sets standards for the FDA’s 
determination of safety and effectiveness, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
 175. For a discussion of this statutory provisions regarding requirements for classification 
panels, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  
 176. For a discussion of the political impetuses for the MDA, see supra notes 36–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 177. For a discussion of the House and Senate reports, see supra note 39 and accompanying 
text.  
 178. For a discussion of Congress wanting to give the FDA authority to regulate fraudulent 
devices, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.  
 179. For a discussion of the congressional concerns about the FDA’s attempts to expand its 
jurisdiction, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  
 180. For a discussion of these statements made in favor of limiting the FDA’s jurisdiction 
during the passage of the MDA, see supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.  
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Taken together, these aspects of the language and passage of the 
MDA indicate that Congress wanted to limit the FDA’s authority to 
determine a device’s safety to scientific inquiries into a device’s 
potential to directly cause physical harm to consumers. Thus, the FDA 
does not have the authority to consider or evaluate nonscientific 
concerns about nonphysical harms that do not directly result from the 
utilization of a device.  
Despite this statutory limitation, these considerations guided the 
FDA’s decisions to ban HIV-testing-kit device applications and restrict 
DTC genetic testing. In both instances, the FDA considered whether 
consumers would react negatively to the test results and subsequently 
make poor medical or life decisions.181 Using these concerns to 
determine the safety of a device is impermissible because negative 
reactions do not constitute direct physical harm. Furthermore, any 
actions that a consumer takes after learning this information are 
completely separate from the test results and, accordingly, do not 
relate directly to the device.182 The tests have served their purpose once 
the consumer receives the test results;183 the HIV-testing kits and DTC 
genetic tests do not provide clinical claims about what consumers 
should or should not do with the information.  
Some might argue that the FDA has the authority to consider 
negative reactions because the information could cause some 
consumers psychological distress, which could lead to physical harm. 
Although such a reaction might be related to the results, this argument 
improperly combines the device’s purpose—to give information and 
nothing more—with the consumer’s own decisions about how to 
respond.184 Further, allowing the FDA to consider how test results 
might affect consumers effectively shifts the regulatory focus away 
from the safety of the device itself to allowing the FDA to act as a 
 
 181. For a discussion of the FDA’s regulatory actions against HIV home-testing kits and DTC 
genetic testing services premised on concerns about consumer reactions to test results, see supra 
Parts II.B and II.C.  
 182. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (noting that “23andMe provides genetic 
information to individuals; any health and medical decisions people make based on that 
information are entirely separate from the services directly provided, and most (if not all) 
significant clinical decisions made on behalf of such information must be made utilizing additional 
technologies under physician consultation” and that “[i]nformation is information, and nothing 
more”). 
 183. See id.  
 184. See id.  
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gatekeeper for disseminating personal information.185 Accordingly, the 
FDA exceeded its statutory authority when it considered these 
potential reactions in determining the safety of the HIV-testing kits 
and DTC genetic testing services.  
B. The FDA’s Interpretation Is Not Entitled to Deference Because the 
Agency Did Not Use and Should Not Have the Relevant Expertise 
To Make These Considerations 
Even if the meaning of “safety” were ambiguous, the courts should 
not defer to the FDA’s broad interpretation of this term. While courts 
use several tests to determine the appropriate level of judicial 
deference for agency statutory interpretation,186 a central theme of the 
Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is that agencies are entitled 
to their interpretation because they possess superior expertise.187 This 
Section will provide an overview of the expertise-based rationale for 
judicial deference as a framework for analyzing the FDA’s regulation 
of the HIV and DTC genetic testing applications. This Note argues that 
although the FDA normally receives deference because of the 
scientific nature of its work, courts should not defer to its expansive 
interpretation of “safety” for medical devices because it did not use its 
scientific expertise when it took regulatory action. Further, the FDA 
should not have the relevant expertise and power to evaluate devices 
based on consumer reactions to test results because the agency should 
not make value judgments about whether consumers are capable of 
seeking and dealing with their own medical information. 
1. The Expertise-Based Rationale for Judicial Deference.  Though 
courts use several frameworks to analyze agency interpretations and 
actions, the Supreme Court has not given much guidance for 
determining the appropriate level of deference given to informal FDA 
 
 185. See id. (“Preventing people from accessing genetic tests . . . calls into question the FDA’s 
authority to limit the dissemination of information. In order to justify such a limitation, we would 
have to strip individuals of their autonomous capacities and challenge the scope of First 
Amendment rights to information.”). 
 186. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1239–50 (2007) (providing a general overview of 
the three major deference tests: Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead).  
 187. The following section draws heavily from the works of Chaffin and Krotoszynski. See 
generally Krotoszynski, supra note 24 (arguing that the expertise rationale for deference has the 
strongest justification for judicial deference); Chaffin, supra note 24 (providing an overview of 
how agency expertise is central to the Supreme Court’s doctrine on judicial deference to agency 
statutory interpretation). 
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documents,188 which the agency utilized in its actions regarding HIV-
testing kits and DTC genetic testing. At least once, the Supreme Court 
has declined to extend Chevron deference to one kind of informal 
guidance from the FDA, but there is no clear standard among lower 
courts for review of informal guidances generally.189 Although there is 
little clarity on this issue, the FDA’s safety determinations can be 
evaluated in light of a central theme in the Supreme Court’s deference 
jurisprudence: agency expertise is highly valued and crucial to 
justifying judicial deference.190  
Agency expertise was the Supreme Court’s traditional rationale 
for granting deference to agency interpretations.191 In an early 
deference case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,192 the Court established a 
standard for deference that was premised on a theory of agency 
expertise.193 In explaining its rationale, the opinion noted that “the 
[agency’s] policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon 
more specialized experience and broader investigations and 
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”194  
Even after Congress created guidance for judicial deference in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),195 two years after Skidmore, 
 
 188. K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 533 (2011). 
 189. In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Court held that one type of informal 
guidance was not entitled to Chevron deference. “[B]ut courts have noted that Wyeth’s rationale” 
was probably motivated by other factors unrelated to the policy’s informal status. Lewis, supra 
note 188, at 533. Further, the only two appellate decisions regarding the 
Christensen/Mead/Barnhart tests, which address the level of deference owed to informal 
documents, came to different conclusions as to what level of deference is appropriate for these 
documents. Id. at 533–34. Additionally, an analysis of “all federal cases involving both FDA and 
the Christensen/Mead/Barnhart” tests found that “[w]hile most district court cases that address 
the issue withhold Chevron deference from informal guidance documents issued by FDA, they 
do so for starkly different reasons.” Id. at 534. Thus, there is no clear answer as to what level of 
deference is appropriate for analyzing informal FDA documents. 
 190. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  
 191. Chaffin, supra note 24, at 529.  
 192. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  
 193. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 739–40.  
 194. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. The Court established a balancing test for reviewing the 
agency’s statutory interpretation: granting deference would depend upon “the thoroughness 
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to 
control.” Id. at 140.  
 195. The APA was enacted in on June 11, 1946. The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. 
No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)). Under 
section 706(2)(B), courts must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(B) (2012).  
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agency expertise continued to play a central role in deference 
determinations.196 One year after the APA’s enactment, the Supreme 
Court “reaffirmed expertise . . . as the source of judicial deference to 
agency work product.”197 In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,198 the Court 
justified upholding an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute 
by endorsing an expertise-based rationale.199 Further, the Court 
reiterated this justification for deference in FTC v. Cement Institute.200 
The majority opinion explained that Congress creates agencies so that 
they have the relevant experience and knowledge to interpret and 
enforce applicable federal laws.201 These functions then give the 
agencies important expertise, which is used in decisionmaking.202 
Taken together, these three cases—Skidmore, Chenery, and Cement 
Institute—show the central role that expertise plays in the deference 
inquiry because “all invoke enhanced agency expertise as the rationale 
for affording agency work product deference on judicial review,” even 
though the latter two cases were decided immediately after Congress 
weighed in on deference standards with the passage of the APA.203   
The Court’s deference jurisprudence shifted in Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,204 but not as 
 
 196. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 740–41. 
 197. Id. at 740.  
 198. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). 
 199. The Court noted: 
The Commission’s conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative 
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the 
product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem, 
realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts. 
It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and 
which justifies the use of the administrative process. Whether we agree or disagree with 
the result reached, it is allowable judgment which we cannot disturb. 
Id. at 209 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945)).  
 200. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).  
 201. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 741; see id. at 720 (noting that the agency’s “long and 
close examination of the questions it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience 
that fits it for performance of its statutory duty”).  
 202. Id. at 741; see Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 720 (noting that, in a previous case, the Court 
“called attention to the express intention of Congress to create an agency whose membership 
would at all times be experienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an expertness 
coming from experience”). 
 203. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 741. 
 204. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the 
Chevron test, the court first determines whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
question at issue.” Id. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear, the agency must follow this expressed 
intent. Id. at 842–43. If the court finds that Congress did not “directly address[] the precise 
question at issue,” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the 
court must determine whether the agency’s construction is “based on a permissible construction 
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significantly as one might think. Some scholars argue that the Chevron 
decision “relocated the basis for judicial deference from expertise to 
an implied delegation of lawmaking power.”205 But there is ample 
evidence that Chevron did not erase the importance of the expertise-
based rationale for deference.206 In a case decided shortly before 
Chevron, the Court characterized judicial deference to “[a]n agency’s 
construction of its own regulations” as “traditional acquiescence in 
administrative expertise.”207 It seems unlikely that the Court would 
abandon this deference justification, particularly without a clear 
explanation of its decision to do so, only a few years later in Chevron. 
Further, the Court in Chevron also explicitly recognized the role that 
agency expertise has in conferring deference when it noted that, unlike 
agencies, “[j]udges are not experts in the field” and are limited in their 
abilities to discern “the incumbent administration’s views of wise 
policy” for making judgments.208 Thus, though Chevron certainly 
marked a shift in the Court’s justification for judicial deference, this 
change did not indicate a complete abandonment of the long 
established expertise-based rationale.  
The Court’s most recent decisions on judicial deference suggest a 
resurgence in the importance of the expertise-based rationale.209 In 
United States v. Mead Corporation210 and Barnhart v. Walton,211 the 
Court created new formulations for deciding whether the Chevron test 
applies to an agency’s interpretation at all.212 In Mead, the Court 
considered whether it should defer to an agency’s informal 
determination—as opposed to formal processes—under Chevron.213 
 
of the statute.” Id. at 843. Thus, an agency’s interpretation stands unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, 
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844. 
 205. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 742. Under this theory, agencies are entitled to judicial 
deference because it is implied that Congress wanted to give them interpretive discretion if the 
elements of the Chevron test are met. 
 206. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 529 (arguing that “recent judicial precedent suggests that 
agency expertise remains a central rationale for judicial deference”). 
 207. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980); Chaffin, supra note 25, at 
528.  
 208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 743.  
 209. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 530 (noting that recent precedent suggests “the continued 
centrality of agency expertise to judicial deference”).  
 210. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).  
 211. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).  
 212. Lewis, supra note 188, at 529. This formulation is also known as the “Chevron Step Zero” 
analysis. Id.  
 213. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221–27 (considering whether a tariff classification by the U.S. 
Customs Service, which did not use formal processes, was entitled to judicial deference).  
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The Court determined that Chevron analysis did not apply to the 
agency’s informal action,214 and its reasoning for doing so supports the 
proposition that agency expertise has a crucial role in determining 
judicial deference.215 First, the majority opinion referenced Skidmore’s 
emphasis on expertise when describing the Court’s understanding and 
application of deference.216 Second, the Court “orient[ed] Skidmore 
deference as a function of expertise”217 when it held that the agency 
might be able to raise a Skidmore claim even though the Court 
determined that Chevron did not apply.218  
In the follow-up case, Barnhart, the Court reaffirmed and clarified 
Mead’s test for whether an agency’s informal decision is entitled to 
Chevron deference.219 The Court’s standard in Barnhart also supports 
the expertise-based rationale for deference because it included “the 
related expertise of the Agency” as a factor for consideration in 
applying the Chevron test.220 Thus, the reaffirmation of the expertise-
based rationale in Mead also suggests that agency expertise is the 
central justification for judicial deference.  
 
 214. Here, the U.S. Customs Service issued a tariff classification which did not use formal 
processes. Id. at 221–24. The Court determined that this action was “far removed not only from 
notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that 
Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them” 
under Chevron. Id. at 231.  
 215. See Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 749 (noting that “Justice Souter orient[ed] Skidmore 
deference as a function of agency expertise”).  
 216. “The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been 
understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care, 
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s 
position.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (internal footnotes omitted).  
 217. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 749. 
 218. Id. The Court explained that “[t]here is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, 
where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized 
experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.  
 219. See Lewis, supra note 188, at 531 (noting that Barnhart clarified the “unidentified 
circumstances” referenced in Mead for instances in which “deference could be warranted in the 
absence of procedural formality and force of law” (quoting Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 
VA. L. REV. 187, 216 (2006))).  
 220. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 530–31 (noting that “Justice Breyer’s opinion in Barnhart 
v. Walton suggests that expertise remains important to the Chevron analysis” because it “appears 
to collapse Skidmore and Chevron into a sliding scale”). The test in Barnhart established that 
courts should consider “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the 
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that 
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long 
period of time” to determine whether “Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which 
to view the legality of the Agency interpretation.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).  
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Although the Court’s major cases regarding judicial deference—
Skidmore, Chevron, Mead, and Barnhart—address different issues 
within the process of adjudicating the appropriate level of agency 
deference, one justification for deference plays a critical role in all of 
these decisions: the expertise-based rationale. Also, this justification is 
often used in practice: many courts “emphasize the importance of an 
agency’s careful consideration and agency expertise when determining 
the amount of deference an agency should receive when interpreting a 
complex statutory scheme.”221 
Furthermore, courts usually afford scientific agencies “super 
deference” based on the scientific nature of their statutory 
interpretations.222 The FDA has often enjoyed this “super deference” 
because of its status as a scientific agency; it is typically afforded a “high 
level of deference” in cases interpreting its scientific or technical 
decisions within its realm of expertise.223 For example, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia explained in a recent decision 
upholding an FDA action224 that when facing an issue framed in terms 
of scientific and technological uncertainty, courts “must proceed with 
particular caution, avoiding all temptation to direct the agency in a 
choice between rational alternatives.”225 In another case, the same 
court deferred to the FDA’s decision to approve a drug because the 
dispute was “fundamentally a scientific one over which the court 
lack[ed] expertise and over which the FDA is the expert.”226 The court 
 
 221. Lewis, supra note 188, at 535.  
 222. This principle came from the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s decision about how to treat nuclear waste disposal issues. Meazell, 
supra note 25, at 741–42. The Court made it clear that the Commission was entitled to deference 
because of its scientific expertise: “[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is 
making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When 
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing 
court must generally be at its most deferential.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983). 
 223. Rempfer v. Von Eschenbach, 535 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 583 F.3d 860 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).  
 224. In this case, military personnel challenged the FDA’s determination that an Anthrax 
vaccine was effective. Id. at 101. 
 225. Id. at 107 (quoting All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D.D.C. 
2000)). 
 226. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212, 220 (D.D.C. 1996). In this case a 
drug company challenged the FDA’s decision to approve a competitor’s application for a generic 
version of their drug. The plaintiff argued in part that the FDA’s process for establishing that the 
bioequivalence of the generic drug was incomplete because the agency changed its policy to only 
require in vitro testing rather than both in vitro and in vivo testing. Thus, the issue in this case was 
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further justified this decision by noting that the FDA “examined the 
relevant data and ‘articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.’”227 Thus, the FDA normally receives this super deference when 
it acts within its scientific and technical expertise. 
2. The FDA Did Not Use and Should Not Have the Relevant 
Expertise To Consider How Consumers Might React to Information 
When Determining Whether a Device is Safe. As this Note argues in 
Part II, over the past several decades the FDA has relied on its 
concerns about consumer reactions to test results to justify its strict 
regulation of devices providing personal medical information in the 
convenience of one’s own home.228 This Note argues that the courts 
should not defer to this interpretation of “safety” under the MDA 
because these considerations regarding consumer reactions to test 
results do not fall under courts’ typical deference to the FDA’s 
scientific expertise. Further, as a policy matter, the FDA should not 
have the expertise to make these determinations because they involve 
making value judgments about access to personal medical information 
that are best left to individuals. 
First, the FDA should not be entitled to deference under an 
expertise-based rationale because it did not rely on its scientific 
expertise when it banned HIV home-testing kits and initially restricted 
DTC genetic testing. As noted in the previous Section,229 the FDA 
normally enjoys super deference because the agency has a “reputation 
for superior science and expertise,”230 which gives the courts 
confidence in the FDA’s role as a “gatekeeper” for new drugs and 
devices.231 Further, the language of the MDA suggests that scientific 
expertise plays a crucial role in determinations about medical devices: 
in the provisions that specify the qualifications relevant for members 
of device classification panels, areas of scientific expertise are the only 
 
not whether the FDA had conducted any scientific testing, but rather whether its requirements 
were sufficiently rigorous. Id. at 214–16. 
 227. Id. at 219–20 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 228. For a discussion of the FDA’s regulation of HIV home tests and DTC genetic tests based 
on consumer protection considerations, see supra Part II.  
 229. For a discussion of the super deference that the courts usually grant the FDA as a 
scientific agency, see supra Part II.B.2.  
 230. James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review, 
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 949 (2008). 
 231. Id.  
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qualifications listed.232 But when the FDA considered taking its initial 
actions against HIV home-testing kits and DTC genetic testing 
services, it did not use scientific expertise. The FDA did not 
demonstrate in its statements or enforcement actions that it relied on 
studies or data showing that people would react a certain way;233 rather, 
it based its decision on unsubstantiated assumptions about potential 
negative reactions from consumers.  
When considering whether to ban applications for HIV home-
testing kits, the FDA relied on testimony focusing on concerns about 
how people would respond to receiving results.234 When the FDA 
reconsidered and ultimately overturned the ban, it attempted to cloak 
its reasoning in scientific considerations, citing as motivating factors 
“scientific and technological developments and the changing nature of 
the HIV epidemic.”235 In reality, the scientific community’s 
understanding of the importance of diagnostic tools in the fight against 
HIV had not wavered during the five-year ban.236 In fact, one company 
even applied for approval for testing devices using “essentially the 
same data” from studies conducted before the ban.237 This evidence 
indicates that the FDA did not utilize its scientific expertise in 
considering the safety of the HIV home-testing kits. Rather, it relied 
on fears unsupported by scientific data. 
Similarly, the FDA also premised its significant restrictions on 
DTC genetic testing on overprotective considerations of consumer 
safety instead of on scientific findings. Before it sent the Warning 
Letter to 23andMe, its recommended restrictions on genetic tests were 
based at least in part on concerns about consumer behavior.238 And 
when the FDA sent 23andMe the Warning Letter, it notified 23andMe 
 
 232. For a discussion of the statutory requirements for device classification panels, see supra 
notes 50–52 and accompanying text.  
 233. For a discussion of the FDA’s reliance on speculation about consumer responses to HIV 
and DTC genetic test results for restrictively regulating both types of devices, see supra Parts II.B 
and II.C.  
 234. For a discussion of testimony given on the danger of allowing HIV home-testing at the 
FDA’s public forum for its ban on device applications, see supra notes 102–04 and accompanying 
text.  
 235. For a discussion of the FDA’s proffered rationale for overturning the ban, see supra 
notes 112–13 and accompanying text.  
 236. For a discussion of the enduring importance of diagnostic tools to combat the spread of 
HIV throughout this time period, see supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.  
 237. FDA Blood Prods. Advisory Comm., supra note 120.  
 238. For a discussion of the FDA Molecular and Clinical Genetics Panel’s early concerns 
about consumer reactions to DTC genetic testing results, see supra notes 141–43 and 
accompanying text.  
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that it was concerned about consumers using the test results as the sole 
basis for taking drastic actions, noting that certain genetic test results 
could prompt individuals to discontinue medical therapies or undergo 
unnecessary treatments.239 Although the FDA has approved some 
carrier and disease-risk tests, it forced 23andMe to meet cumbersome 
requirements to demonstrate clinical validity during this process.240 
Additionally, the FDA seems unwilling to consider approving tests for 
important genetic information, such as the BRCA breast cancer genes, 
simply because the results could be used for diagnostic purposes.241 The 
FDA’s expressed fears about potential negative reactions, swift action 
against DTC genetic testing manufacturers, and strict clinical validity 
requirements indicate that the agency is acting at least partially on 
concerns about whether consumers can effectively weigh the risks and 
benefits of seeking this information.  
In both cases—the HIV-testing kits and DTC genetic tests—the 
FDA based its decisions to restrict consumers’ access to their own 
medical information on notions of consumer protectionism rather than 
on scientific inquiries into the safety and effectiveness of the devices. 
This basis is unlike that used in cases in which courts defer to the FDA’s 
judgment. For example, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala,242 the 
District Court for the District of Columbia deferred to a drug approval 
decision by the FDA not only because the dispute was “a scientific 
one” in which “the FDA is the expert,” but also because the FDA had 
“examined the relevant data and ‘articulate[d] a satisfactory 
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’”243 Although the HIV-testing kit and 
DTC genetic testing cases deal with the FDA’s determinations on the 
safety of the devices, a court’s rationale for deferring to the FDA’s 
decisions should be the same—it should rely on studies and show a 
reasonable connection between the data and its conclusions. The FDA 
 
 239. For a discussion of the Warning Letter, see supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
Although the FDA has a legitimate concern that the tests might give false positive results, it 
should be noted that “most (if not all) significant clinical decisions made on behalf of such 
information must be made utilizing additional technologies under physician consultation.” 
Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10. 
 240. For a discussion of the requirements that the FDA placed on 23andMe for demonstrating 
the analytical and clinical validity of these tests, see supra notes 150, 157–58 and accompanying 
text.  
 241. For a discussion of the FDA’s rationale for effectively banning DTC genetic tests that 
could be used for diagnostic purposes, see supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text. 
 242. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1996). 
 243. Id. at 219–20 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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did not do this data-based or scientific analysis when it banned HIV 
home-testing-kit applications or when it placed burdensome 
restrictions on DTC genetic testing manufacturers like 23andMe. 
Instead, the FDA simply asserted that it had these concerns, suggesting 
that its fears over how consumers might use the information 
sufficiently justified its actions. Accordingly, courts should not afford 
the FDA the deference that it typically enjoys as a scientific agency 
because, in these instances, it did not use its scientific expertise when it 
considered potential consumer reactions to the information given by 
these devices.  
Not only did the FDA not use its expertise to make these 
determinations, but, as a policy matter, courts should not defer to the 
agency’s expansive interpretation of “safety,” even if the FDA used the 
relevant expertise and based its restrictions for these devices on 
scientific data about consumer reactions. The FDA certainly has the 
ability to convene advisory panels to consider the scientific evidence 
on the analytical validity of these devices to ensure that they give 
accurate results,244 and it can weigh the benefits of a device with the 
risks of potential side effects or direct physical harms. However, when 
evaluating the safety of a purely informative device, the FDA should 
not be permitted to consider the actions that consumers might take 
after receiving test results for two reasons. 
First, considering how consumers will react to test results 
disregards the distinction between “providing information and 
providing opportunities to act upon information.”245 The DTC genetic 
test has fulfilled its entire purpose once the consumer receives the 
result; any action taken by the recipient in response to the information 
is “entirely separate from the services directly provided.”246 For 
instance, 23andMe’s test results—interpretations of genetic variants—
“relate only indirectly to preventing or diagnosing disease.”247 Using 
these interpretations is thus analogous to “inferences drawn about 
 
 244. These considerations would certainly constitute ensuring “safety and effectiveness” 
under the MDA because one of the motivating factors for passing the statute was giving the FDA 
greater authority to take action against ineffective and fraudulent devices. Further, the MDA 
provides that device classification panels are comprised of individuals with the relevant scientific 
expertise for evaluating the “safety and effectiveness of devices.” For further discussion of the 
classification panel, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.  
 245. Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Green & Farahany, supra note 2, at 286.  
BAIRD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/13/2017  8:33 AM 
424  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:383 
rapid weight loss measured by a bathroom scale.”248 Additionally, most 
significant clinical decisions made after receiving genetic test results, 
such as a woman getting a mastectomy in response to learning that she 
has a high risk of getting breast cancer, require further testing and 
physician consultation.249 Accordingly, the FDA should not consider 
potential consumer reactions to information when determining 
whether a device is “safe” because those considerations are outside the 
scope of the device’s purpose.  
Second, we should not give the FDA the ability to weigh the costs 
and benefits of potential reactions because these considerations 
involve value judgments that take effective testing options out of the 
hands of consumers. Some might argue that social scientists, 
psychologists, and other experts on human behavior could serve on 
FDA advisory panels to help the agency make these determinations. 
This argument ignores the underlying problem with these 
considerations; in making these inquiries, the FDA steps into the shoes 
of the consumer and decides whether she can be trusted with weighing 
the benefits of learning the results against the potential risks of an 
upsetting outcome. Essentially, the FDA is making a paternalistic 
value judgment—that it is better to ensure zero negative reactions by 
limiting consumer access to this information across the board than to 
allow people to make their own choices about whether the tests are 
appropriate for them. However, consumers are able to make 
assessments about the risks and benefits of pursuing DTC genetic 
testing for themselves, especially in light of the abundance of online 
resources available regarding genetic testing and gene variants.250  
The value judgments based on concerns about consumer reactions 
to test results are similar to one of the predominant motivations 
underlying the FDA’s early seizure of pregnancy tests—that women 
should only get test results in a clinical setting.251 There, the FDA did 
not trust women with information about their pregnancy. In the case 
 
 248. Id.  
 249. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (noting that any “significant clinical 
decisions made on behalf of [information from test results] must be made utilizing additional 
technologies under physician consultation”). 
 250. For instance, the NIH has created a “Genetics Home Reference,” which “provides 
consumer-friendly information about the effects of genetic variation on human health.” Genetics 
Home Reference, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY MED. (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov 
[https://perma.cc/MUN6-4T5R]. This website seems to cover all aspects of genetic testing and is 
aimed at public consumption. Id.  
 251. For a discussion of the FDA’s early hostility towards pregnancy tests, see supra Part II.A. 
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of DTC genetic testing, the FDA does not trust consumers with 
information about their genetic variants linked to certain diseases or 
conditions. After decades of home pregnancy test use, this 
overprotective FDA action is almost unimaginable; although some 
women might be distraught by their test results, we trust their personal 
judgment in seeking this information through home pregnancy tests. 
This rationale should apply to all devices that seek solely to provide 
personal medical information, such as DTC genetic testing, as long as 
the test meets the normal standards for safety and effectiveness.  
Ultimately, the FDA’s self-prescribed role as a gatekeeper of 
personal medical information significantly interferes with individual 
autonomy.252 The FDA’s current restrictive regulation of DTC genetic 
testing significantly limits access to genetic information. Before 
23andMe received the FDA Warning Letter, it was offering over two 
hundred health reports based on genetic test results for ninety-nine 
dollars.253 Currently, consumers must go to a medical professional to 
access those genetic tests that 23andMe offered, but which the FDA 
has still not approved.254 These tests ordinarily cost between one 
hundredand two thousand dollars each,255 and also involve other 
hurdles, including access issues in nonmetropolitan areas, concerns 
about confidentiality of medical records, and genetic discrimination.256 
Thus, courts should adjudge the FDA’s value judgment in its efforts to 
restrict DTC genetic testing impermissible because it relies on 
overprotective notions of consumer safety and severely limits 
individuals’ access to their own medical information. 
 
 252. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (“Preventing people from accessing 
genetic tests . . . calls into question the FDA’s authority to limit the dissemination of information. 
In order to justify such a limitation, we would have to strip individuals of their autonomous 
capacities and challenge the scope of First Amendment rights to information.”). 
 253. Hof, supra note 1.  
 254. See Help Me Understand Genetics: How Is Genetic Testing Done?, NIH U.S. NAT’L 
LIBRARY MED. 8 (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/procedure [https://perma.cc/
Z7SF-UCZJ] (explaining that “[o]nce a person decides to proceed with genetic testing, a medical 
geneticist, primary care doctor, specialist, or nurse practitioner can order the test”). 
 255. Help Me Understand Genetics: What Is the Cost of Genetic Testing, and How Long Does 
It Take To Get the Results?, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY MED. 17 (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
primer/testing/costresults [https://perma.cc/M8YJ-7TXG]. 
 256. Kathryn Hock et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: An Assessment of Genetic 
Counselor’s Knowledge and Beliefs, 13 GENET. MED. 325, 326 (2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past several decades, the FDA has successfully restricted 
consumers’ access to home-testing applications based on a paternalistic 
notion of protecting them from their own potential reactions to test 
results. In the 1970s, the FDA wanted to restrict women’s access to 
pregnancy tests and keep these devices in the hands of laboratories. 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the FDA categorically banned 
applications for HIV home-testing technology based on the fear that 
consumers could not handle the results without the assistance of a 
counselor. And more recently, the agency placed burdensome 
restrictions on DTC genetic testing companies because it was 
concerned that consumers would make irrational medical decisions 
based on genetic variant results. These restrictions illustrate a 
disturbing trend with major consequences for current and future 
technologies. Ultimately, the FDA’s decision to act as gatekeeper, 
limiting consumers’ access to their medical information, is premised on 
an impermissible value judgment that significantly restricts individual 
autonomy.  
 
